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RELIGIOUSLY BASED JUDGMENTS AND
DISCOURSE IN POLITICAL LIFE
KENT GREENAWALT
INTRODUCTION
This essay explores related subjects that lie at and beyond the
edge of the Establishment Clause understood as a legal
constraint on what governments may do.' The latter part of the
essay considers the constitutional question of whether, when the
law enforces a moral judgment that is grounded squarely on
religious sentiments, that violates the Establishment Clause. No
one doubts that laws against killing and stealing are all right,
although one reason that some people think these acts are wrong
is because the Ten Commandments forbids them. But what of
laws that lack a plausible secular justification or would not have
been adopted except for religious sentiments? Some think one or
both of these characterizations are true about laws limiting
marriage of persons of different genders, laws restricting sexual
acts among consenting adults, laws (or administrative decisions)
forbidding government assistance for stem cell research, laws
prohibiting abortions. Occasional judicial opinions and more
extensive writings by scholars have suggested that certain
exercises in the enforcement of a morality that is grounded in
religious premises are unconstitutional. I undertake to explain
to what extent this thesis has support in the existing law and to
what extent it represents a wise understanding of the
Establishment Clause. In that endeavor, I shall look carefully at
1 This essay is drawn from Chapters 23 and 24 of KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND
THE CONSTITUTION: Vol. 2: NONESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (to be published in spring
of 2008 by Princeton University Press). Those chapters in turn draw from parts of
previously published essays and lectures, although Chapter 24 (Section VIII of this essay)
represents new writing.
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
exactly which kinds of laws and government policies might be
covered.
The controversy over legal enforcement of morality is one
aspect of a wider discussion about the role of religion in our
political life and in the political life of liberal democracies more
generally. This discussion, which is often cast as one about
"public reasons," definitely reaches beyond constitutional law,
but one can, as I shall explain, think of it as concerning concepts
of nonestablishment and free exercise in the realm of political
philosophy. It thus merits our consideration for its own sake, but
it is also a needed backdrop for the specifically legal discussion to
follow. Because I have written on this subject extensively, 2 my
treatment here will be highly summary, but it does sketch the
basic positions and competing claims.
Before we begin, a caution about the relation between the
competing claims in political philosophy and their relevance for
constitutional law may help. For the most part, we assume that
when a government violates the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause, a court presented with a case involving a
violation will say so. That is an oversimplification, one that is
particularly relevant for this essay. One might believe that a fair
amount of legislation enforcing morality violates the
Establishment Clause, but not in a way a court can declare. One
might believe that individual legislators violate the
Establishment Clause, or some spirit of the Establishment
Clause, even though the official action to which they contribute
does not do so. I shall say more about these nuances in what
follows, but one needs to recognize that the conceivable options
about the status of various claims are more complex than
(merely) political philosophy or (enforceable) constitutional law.
I. "PUBLIC REASONS" AND THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS
JUDGMENTS
Influenced by the writings of John Rawls, 3  political
philosophers in recent decades have debated whether political
2 RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (Oxford University Press 1988);
PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (Oxford University Press 1995).
3 The most relevant passages for this subject are in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54
(Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
[Vol. 22:2
RELIGIOUSLYBASEDJUDGMEN7S
decisions in liberal democracies should be based on public
reasons, reasons accessible in the right way to all citizens. It is
generally assumed that reasons grounded in religious premises
fall outside the domain of public reasons. If citizens and officials
improperly rely heavily on religious premises in advocating and
adopting laws, we could think of that as a misguided
"establishment" of religion, although not one necessarily covered
by the Establishment Clause.
People who challenge the injection of religion in politics adopt
what we may call an "exclusive" position. Religion should be
excluded from politics. In the politics of pluralist liberal
democracies, decisions (they claim) should be made on grounds
that are shared premises of that form of government and on
forms of justification and ways of determining facts that are
accessible to all citizens. Whatever is the exact mix of the
rational, nonrational, and irrational in religious understandings,
no religious perspective is shared by all citizens; no perspective
rests on methods of justification and determining facts that are
accessible in the required way. To some extent, religious belief
depends on faith, personal experience, and distinctive tradition;
adherents of one religion cannot present logical arguments that
alone will persuade outsiders to their views. Religious belief and
practice is fine for individuals and communities of faith, and
religious perspectives may enrich our cultural understandings.
But at least when citizens are coerced, the state acts unfairly
unless it has reasons that have force for all citizens. Religious
reasons do not fall into this category. They do not belong in
democratic politics. This is a matter of fairness, and also of
political stability. Neither citizens nor officials should present
religious reasons in public debate; neither group should rely on
such reasons.
Some brief clarifications about this "exclusive" position can
help avoid confusion. First, it concerns politics, not broader
public culture. It need not assert that religion belongs in a
private, wholly nonpublic sphere; it need assert only that religion
should be kept out of politics. Second, no one claims that people
will be wholly uninfluenced by religious understandings. Any
claim of that sort would be extremely naive. People should
discuss political issues in public without reliance on religious
premises and they should try to make up their minds accordingly.
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Third, the claim is not that religion is foolish superstition and
therefore deserves no place in our political life. Of course, all
arguments based on foolish superstition should be avoided, but if
that were the basis for excluding religion, the exclusion would
have to rest on persuasive argument that religion is foolish
superstition. Whatever they may think about religion,
proponents of exclusion base their position on premises of
democratic government, not on the intrinsic foolishness of
religion. More to the point, more than ninety percent of our
citizens identify themselves as religious; one cannot reasonably
suppose he or she should avoid religion in politics because
religion is foolish. Finally, we have to be careful about what the
"exclusive" position entails. What is mainly being urged is "self-
exclusion." No one proposes that anyone can be punished or
silenced for making religious arguments; indeed, guarantees of
free speech and free exercise protect such arguments. The
proposal is that people should refrain from making religious
arguments because they do not fit with how liberal democracies
should work. Whether a misguided reliance on religious grounds
could make a law invalid is a topic left for Section VIII.
The competing inclusive position is that citizens and officials
should be able to rely on whatever sources of understanding seem
to them most reliable and illuminating. If a respected religious
authority like the Pope, or a divinely inspired text, or one's
personal sense of how God relates to human beings, suggests that
we should help those who are less fortunate, why should that not
count for our position on welfare reform and medical insurance?
People do not feel whole if they try to divorce their deepest
sources of insight from their political stances. Moreover, shared
premises and methods of justification are too thin to resolve
many political issues; they just do not settle enough in a society
as diverse and divided as our own. Fairness consists not in
exclusion, even self-exclusion, but in everyone relying on what
they think is most convincing. Indeed, the ability to rely on one's
religious convictions is part of the free exercise of religion. A full
airing of all those views will enrich everyone's understanding.
People can often learn from others who do not share their
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fundamental religious beliefs.4 A healthy democracy will not be
unstable if religious arguments are part of political discourse.
For the inclusive position, only one clarification is required. A
defender of that position need not claim that every ground for a
political position is appropriate. Some grounds may be contrary
to premises of liberal democracy. We now suppose that racism
and other denials of equal worth fall into this category. But
religion has never been so regarded in our country. From the
beginning, religious belief and practice have been thought fully
compatible with the underpinnings of our political order.
As I have put it so far, the controversy about religious grounds
seems fairly straightforward, if not easy to resolve, but matters
are in fact much more complicated. No one claims that it is only
religious reasons that are excluded by public reasons, and it
becomes evident upon examination that deciding which reasons
count as public is not simple. Perhaps we might do better to
think of reasons that are more or less public. And I shall argue
that it should make a crucial difference for whether one should
rely on nonpublic reasons whether he or she is an ordinary
citizen or an official and, if an official, engaging in public
discourse or employing grounds of judgment.
Some of the difficulties with deciding what count as "public
reasons" may be illustrated with reference to natural law theory,
a theory that is powerfully associated with Roman Catholic
tradition, but is not limited to that tradition and in modern times
has typically been defended as not resting on religious premises. 5
According to my understanding, the standard, full-bodied,6
natural law position rests on the following premises:
1. Human life is integrally related to all of existence.
2. Human nature is universal.
4 See JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR
DISCONTENTS (Princeton Univ. Press 2001); JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
(Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
5 The leading treatment in Anglo-American legal philosophy is that of JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
6 Readers of legal philosophy will be familiar with Lon Fuller's idea of a procedural
natural law, THE MORALITY OF LAW (Yale Univ. Press 1977) and Ronald Dworkin's
"naturalism," LAW'S EMPIRE (Belknapp Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1986) and his
Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). These are much more modest in
their claims.
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3. The defining characteristic of human beings is their
reason or rationality.
4. Human beings have inherent purposes (the teleological
approach usually associated with St. Thomas Aquinas) or
self-evident goods (the approach some modern proponents of
natural law defend)7.
5. These purposes, or goods, are discoverable by reason,
reason being understood in a broad sense to include the light
of experience.
6. Morality is objective, universal, and discoverable by
reason.
7. People's moral obligations are consonant with their own
true purposes, or their realization of self-evident goods, and
with their true happiness.
8. At the deepest levels, no conflict arises between
individual good and the common good.
9. Human laws appropriately reflect the natural law
(though not every dictate of natural law should be subject to
state coercion). Human laws appropriately determine details
left open by natural law, such as the precise punishments for
various crimes, and they settle matters of indifference.
10. Human laws that are not in accord with natural law are
not "really" law in some sense. A failure to accord with
natural law may occur if a human law requires behavior that
natural law forbids, or if a law forbids behavior that natural
law values, or if the burdens and benefits of a law are highly
unjust.
II. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE STEM CELL DEBATE
To grasp the complexities of a concept of public reasons and the
place of natural law, it helps to start with an illustration drawn
from a contentious political issue during the presidency of George
7 See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 5.
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W. Bush-the question whether the federal government should
fund research with embryonic stem cells. Before the President's
decision to allow funding only to existing lines of stem cells, The
Wall Street Journal carried a debate between David Baltimore, a
Nobel laureate scientist, and president of the California Institute
of Technology, and Robert George, a political and legal
philosopher who teaches at Princeton.8
Dr. Baltimore argued strongly in favor of federal funding.
Adult stem cells are not now a viable alternative to embryonic
stem cells, which have "the potential to become every part of the
human body" and could be used to make up for the deficits in
brain and pancreas cells that cause Parkinson's disease or
diabetes. 9 For these stem cells to become practically effective in
curing human diseases, scientists must carry forward work of
many types. The "publicly funded American academic research
effort is far and away the most effective ... in the world. To
refuse to allow it to participate in this exciting research would be
an affront to the American people, especially those who suffer
from diseases that could one day be reversed by these miraculous
cells."' 0
About the concern that the embryos deserve protection, Dr.
Baltimore had this to say: "To me, a tiny mass of cells that has
never been in a uterus is hardly a human being .... By treating
the use of such stem cells as akin to murder, we would lose a
great deal.""1
That is the issue to which Professor George devoted his full
attention. He did not discuss the likely medical benefits of
embryonic stem-cell research because these were irrelevant, in
his view. It is wrong to harvest organs from human beings
without their consent. "[K]illing for the purpose of harvesting
body parts ... is inconsistent with the inherent dignity of all
human beings."12 A human being, Professor George claimed, is a
whole, living member of the species Homo sapiens. Unlike a
sperm cell or an ovum, or skin cells, human embryos, "[m]odern
8 Compare David Baltimore, Stem Cell Research: A Debate Don't Impede Medical
Progress, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at A18, with Robert P. George, Stem Cell Research: A
Debate-Don't Destroy Human Life, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2001, at A18.
9 Baltimore, supra note 8, at A18.
10 Baltimore, supra note 8, at A18.
11 Baltimore, supra note 8, at A18.
12 George, supra note 8, at A18.
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMAENTARY
science shows[,] ... are whole, living members of the human
species, who are capable of directing from within their own
integral organic functioning and development into and through
the fetal, infant, child, and adolescent stages of life and
ultimately into adulthood."13 It is not that a human embryo has
the potential to be a human being, but that he or she "is already
a living human being."14 Professor George eschewed relying on
controversial religious premises such as "ensoulment"; he said
the science will do just fine and he would be pleased if opponents
would agree that the scientific facts about when new human
beings begin should be determinative. 15 Given the status of
embryos as human beings, compromises, such as using stem cells
from embryos created by in-vitro fertilization that would be
discarded in any event, are unacceptable. 16
Do Dr. Baltimore's and Professor George's arguments count as
ones of public reason? To answer that question we need to relate
the basis of philosophies of public reasons to the possible scope of
those reasons. We need to ask both what count as public reasons
and when people should be constrained to rely on them.
A typical public reason is that citizens' opportunities should
not depend on their race, gender, or religion. This is a central
tenet of the modern political theory of liberal democracy; to
embrace it, one need not reach to controversial moral theories or
religious perspectives. David Baltimore's contention that use of
stem cells can produce important medical benefits is a public
reason; everyone agrees that cure of disease and disability is
good. On the other hand, the claim that biblical passages tell us
that God abhors homosexual acts is not a public reason; it relies
on a text that does not carry authority for all reasonable citizens.
Whatever the exact range of public reasons, they do not include
reasons drawn from biblical revelation or church authority.
Within a liberal society, people will disagree about such
fundamental matters as the existence and nature of God and the
13 George, supra note 8, at A18.
14 George, supra note 8, at A18.
15 George, supra note 8, at A18. Professor George noted in passing that the Catholic
Church has no official position on the "eternal destiny" of embryos.
16 George, supra note 8, at A18. Professor George did not comment on President Bush's
actual compromise of allowing research on lines from embryos already destroyed. George
also did not address the possibility that stem cells might be harvested from unfertilized
eggs; see Nicholas Wade, New Stem Cell Source Called Possible, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002,
at A23.
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quality of a good life. The idea is that when citizens adhere to
public reasons, they respect each other as free and equal citizens;
they take intractable moral and religious questions off the
political agenda. If Robert George's argument against stem-cell
research depended on a belief about ensoulment, derived from
church doctrine, it would not be a public reason.
Theorists disagree not only about who should constrain
themselves to rely on public reasons but also when. Does the
constraint apply in the same way to officials and ordinary
citizens? Should public reasons underlie all laws and policies, or
all coercive laws,17 or, as John Rawls proposed, constitutional
essentials and basic matters of justice?1S Does a constraint of
public reasons concern the underlying grounds on which people
decide, the explanations and arguments they put forward on
behalf of their positions, or both of these?
Theorists also disagree over exactly what makes reasons
nonpublic. Among the candidates that have been suggested are
ideas of the good (or controversial ideas of the good), nonrational
grounds, reasons that are not widely accepted, and
comprehensive views (roughly, overarching philosophies of life).
The notion that coercive laws, in particular, should be based on
public reasons is that people should not be compelled on the basis
of reasons that are not persuasive for them. If the government is
not coercing people, its reasons matter less. Our stem-cell
example presses hard on that distinction. We know that the
government would fund this research were it not for concern
about embryos. If it refuses to fund, many scientists will not do
stem-cell research and, much more important, sufferers of
diseases like Parkinson's and Alzheimer's may not receive critical
medical benefits that might otherwise have been available. Can
it be that the government needs public reasons if it is to coerce
people not to hunt endangered species, but that it can curtail
potential life-saving medical assistance on the basis of nonpublic
reasons? That would be paradoxical.
The stem-cell illustration also helps to show why we should not
draw a sharp distinction between ordinary political issues and
constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice. As Rawls
17 1 am putting aside, for purposes of this analysis, those situations in which it is
perfectly appropriate to vote on the basis of self-interest,
18 See generally RAWLS, supra note 3.
2007]
ST JOIHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
has applied these terms, a right to abortion falls within
constitutional essentials;19 funding of stem-cell research is an
ordinary issue. For both abortion and stem-cell research, the
central question is whether conception gives rise to a human
being (or potential human being) who deserves society's
protection. Can it be that we should rely only on public reasons
to determine the legal treatment of abortion but may rely on
nonpublic reasons in respect to stem-cell research? Not only is
this conclusion odd from a theoretical point of view, convincing
people that the status of an embryo may be determined in one
way for one political issue and must be determined in another
way for a related issue would be very difficult. I conclude that,
insofar as public reasons are concerned, no sharp line should be
drawn between coercive and noncoercive laws or between
ordinary issues, on the one hand, and constitutional essentials
and questions of basic justice on the other. 20
III. WHEN SHOULD CITIZENS AND OFFICIALS FEEL CONSTRAINED
BY PUBLIC REASONS, NOT RELYING ON SPECIFICALLY RELIGIOUS
GROUNDS?: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Most proponents of public reasons have assumed that any
constraint applies in the same manner to officials and citizens,
and in the same manner to grounds of judgment and public
discourse. 21 My position differs: it relies heavily on distinctions
between advocacy and justification, on the one hand, and
grounds of judgment, on the other, and between officials and
ordinary citizens.
When we think about how we make up our minds and how we
discuss issues, we realize that monitoring our discourse is a lot
easier than restricting our bases for decision. Moreover, other
people hear our discourse; they cannot know our full grounds of
decision. These truths have great importance.
19 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 243 n.32 (discussing balance of political values
concerning human life, reproduction and equality of women).
20 One might think, however, that a constraint to follow public reasons is especially
important as laws and policies impinge on members of society in more important ways.
21 For a discussion of various arguments about how public reasons apply to citizens see
Paul J. Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason, in ROBERT P. GEORGE AND
CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 125 (Georgetown Univ. Press
2000).
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Most people would be hard put to try to carry out a program of
excluding their deepest religious convictions from their political
judgments. They could not disentangle what they believe
because of underlying religious convictions from what they would
believe if they relied only on premises of liberal democracy and
shared techniques of understanding.
Speaking without reference to religious convictions is not
difficult. Members of our law faculty share an assumption that
school problems are to be resolved in terms of values that are not
explicitly connected to particular comprehensive views. I have
yet to hear a specifically Jewish, Christian, atheist, or
Benthamite argument for a faculty decision. Yet, when decisions
involve the point of legal education, I doubt that colleagues try
rigorously to remove the threads of their religious
understandings about the nature of society and education for a
profession.
If it is working, a constraint of public reasons is reciprocal.
People can tell easily whether arguments are being made from
explicit religious premises; they will know if restraint on their
part is matched. If they try to purge their silent deliberations of
religious influence, they cannot be sure if others are similarly
motivated. And once someone realizes just how arduous this
purging exercise is, he will question the success of others, even if
he thinks they are trying. Such uncertainties are a poor basis for
reciprocity.
Consider some differences between officials and ordinary
citizens. Officials have a lot more to do with the law that gets
made and applied than do citizens; there are a lot more citizens
than officials. Officials are used to making judgments and
offering reasons that do not include all that is relevant in their
personal lives. Citizens are less used to practicing such
restraint. Perhaps a highly educated, participating citizenry
could learn to draw distinctions between what matters for most
aspects of life and what matters for politics. But that is not our
citizenry. When officials practice restraint, that impinges much
less on a population's religious liberty than when citizens do so.
Official restraint more greatly affects the quality of political life.
These basic distinctions-between advocacy and judgment and
between officials and citizens-suggest that if any self-exclusion
2007]
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is justified, it is self-exclusion for officials in their public
statements.
Among officials, we can divide roughly between those who
apply law and those who make law or exercise ordinary
discretionary judgment. Among those who apply law, judges and
quasi-judicial officials often provide reasoned justifications for
their decisions. At this stage of American history, one does not
often find explicitly religious grounding in opinions, even when
courts reach beyond standard legal sources to comment on the
social benefits or harms of a possible ruling. By an explicitly
religious grounding, I mean reasoning in this form: "Given a true
religious proposition, these conclusions about social good follow."
Some examination of religious sources might be acceptable to
show the community's attitudes toward a practice or its deep
moral assumptions, and judges might employ familiar religious
stories to illustrate a point; but none of these is a reliance on
religious grounds in the sense that I mean. Although judicial
opinions are rarely completely candid about the strength of
competing arguments, one expects judges to rely on arguments
they believe should have force for all judges. In our culture, this
excludes arguments based on particular religious premises.
When we turn to legislators, we may start with the proposition
that if an explicit religious grounding were placed in the
preamble to a statute, that should be viewed as a promotion of
religion that would violate the Establishment Clause. Although
the use of religious language has increased among legislators and
executive officials during the administration of George W. Bush,
it is still true that members of Congress typically do not make
religious arguments on the floor of Congress or before their
constituents. There is, however, no accepted understanding that
they should avoid giving any weight to their own religious
convictions, and to those of constituents, in the formulation of
their positions. I believe legislators should give greater weight to
reasons that are generally available than to those they
understand are not; but some reliance on religious and similar
reasons is appropriate, especially since the generally available
reasons are radically indecisive about some crucial social
problems.
If legislators rely on religious understandings more than their
public advocacy reflects, are they not lacking in candor? Does
[Vol. 22:2
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restraint impoverish discourse and leave voters less well
informed than they might be? Realism counsels that much of
what legislators say is far from fully candid, so self-restraint
about religious grounds is hardly a major contributor to lack of
candor. In any event, the value of self-restraint overrides this
drawback and whatever reduction in information voters suffer.
Legislators should not deny religious bases that motivate them,
but they should not develop public arguments in these terms.
Because citizens are not used to practicing self-restraint of this
kind, and because most citizens have little involvement in the
political process, I do not think they should regard themselves as
constrained to avoid relying on religious grounds or to avoid
stating those grounds. Some citizens, however, such as
university and corporation presidents, and individuals
consistently engaged in political life, have a much more public
role. For them, something like the constraints for legislators is
appropriate.
Religious leaders and organizations have a special place. They
properly develop religious grounds as these relate to political
problems, and they also properly take part in direct efforts to win
support for particular positions, although it is usually
unfortunate when religious leaders endorse parties or
candidates.
Much of the theorizing about public reasons and religious
reasons has been cast in terms of liberal democracies in general,
or as what the Establishment Clause of our Constitution actually
requires. Neither of these approaches answers the most central
practical questions. The Establishment Clause, in its direct
force, has modest implications. It is mainly about what laws do,
not why they are enacted. What of liberal democracies and
theories of legitimacy? Democratic theorists argue persuasively
that in a liberal society people will adopt many different
comprehensive views. This condition will not change. The
history of western liberal democracies, forged out of religious
division, shows that differences in religious views can be a source
of intense conflict; but we can imagine people of various religious
views who seek to learn from one another and who trust each
other's social judgments. These people might welcome religious
perspectives in political discourse. On the other hand, one might
not recommend an explicitly religious politics as the most fruitful
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approach for a newly constituted Northern Ireland or for the
fledgling, fragile union that may emerge in Bosnia. Much
depends on history, culture, the religious and other broad views
that people hold, and their degree of mutual tolerance and
respect. Specific principles of self-restraint should be offered for
particular political orders, not in gross. If this is true about
religious discourse and public reason, it is also true about many
other practical issues to which political philosophers speak.22
The United States is a country of great diversity in culture and
religion. The percentage of our people that is neither Christian
nor Jewish increases steadily, with immigration policies that no
longer discriminate egregiously against Asians. Outright
religious conflict is rare, but religious differences remain a source
of distrust and tension. Religious convictions are intense and
widespread enough to influence politics and to disturb people
with their influence. That is partly why some restraint may be
needed.
IV. WHAT COUNTS AS PUBLIC REASONS?
A general degree of acceptance cannot alone be the test of what
reasons are public. Were that the only standard, Christians
could rely on the New Testament in a country that was mainly
Christian; Muslims could rely on the Koran in a Muslim society.
This evident inequality for what happen to be minority
perspectives conflicts with the ideals of liberal democracy.
General acceptance might play some role in whether reasons are
relevantly public, but it cannot be the exclusive or primary
standard. 23
Sometimes it is suggested that particular ideas of the good, or
controversial ideas of the good, are what are excluded by public
22 One may analyze the problem of public reason and the closely related problem of
religion and politics from a particular religious or other "comprehensive" view, say Roman
Catholicism, Orthodox Judaism, liberal Protestantism, or Kantianism, and see what
implications follow, or one may try to do "detached" political philosophy, not relying on
any particular comprehensive view. Both exercises are valuable. What I do summarily in
this chapter is the latter, "detached" political philosophy, although readers will not be
surprised that my conclusions fit my own comprehensive view, a variety of liberal
Protestantism. The hope is that the analysis will appeal to those who hold different
comprehensive views.
23 For one claim about general acceptance see Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and
Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS AND PUB.
POL Y 13, 18 (1984).
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reasons. 24 People have various convictions about what makes life
good, and they should be able to pursue these within a
framework of just social relations and mutual respect. 25 This
position, to be clear, is not that the government should avoid all
moral questions, but that it limit itself to moral questions that
concern justice and mutual respect, not resolving moral questions
about how people should live.26 This constraint alone leaves
untouched much that proponents of public reasons believe should
be excluded. Most notably, it does not exclude much that
religions have to say about just social relations. 27 Here, our stem-
cell illustration is illuminating. Whether embryonic stem cells
should be used for medical purposes is not an issue about the
good life; it is an issue of justice and respect for the embryo that
may be a human being. If the only public reasons constraint
concerned claims about the good life, an argument that a papal
encyclical condemns stem-cell research would be within the
realm of public reasons. But that. sort of argument is just the
kind the public-reasons filter is designed to exclude. So a
constraint of public reasons cannot be limited to questions of the
good life.
Should it at least include all such questions, whatever else it
may also contain? The answer is "No." We expect public schools
to educate children about desirable ways to live, about the
importance of physical and mental health, about the dangers of
addictions, about the benefits of culture, and about the value of
activity as contrasted with indolence. All these aspects of what
schools do cannot be summarized fully as helping to make
children into good citizens and aiding them to realize whatever
goals they set for themselves; they encourage students to live
well according to our society's ideas of what a good life contains.
State support of arts and literature and high taxes on alcohol and
cigarettes show that the government's involvement in questions
of the good life extends to adults. Laws against the use of drugs
are controversial, but few object to laws that forbid human beings
24 See generally CHARLES E. LARMORE, PArrERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1987).
25 See LARMORE, supra note 24, at 118-35.
26 See LARMORE, supra note 24, at 133 ( "[T]he ideal of neutrality must always take
precedence over disputed ideals of the good life.").
27 More precisely, it does not exclude religious conclusions about just relations that do
not depend on claims about what is a good life.
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from having sex with animals. These cannot be defended as
consistent with neutrality about the good life, unless one
(implausibly) regards them as mainly protecting animals that
would be potential sexual partners.
It is at least a defensible position that the state should not
coerce people in respect to controversial judgments about the
good life; 28 but the basis for such a position seems to be more a
judgment that individuals should have autonomy in this realm
than a judgment that the reasons for coercion could never be
sufficiently public.
Another possibility for grounds that do not qualify as public is
reasons that do not rest on rational grounds. Here, roughly, the
idea is that people should be able to rely on reasoned arguments
that other people can understand and accept, not on faith or
intuition that others do not share.29 Remember how careful
Professor George was to say that his argument against stem-cell
research did not depend on controversial religious premises but
on the scientific facts. One difficulty with the rational grounds
approach is drawing the line between rational grounds and
nonrational bases for judgment. In much of what we believe,
rational understanding, however that is conceived, intertwines
with other assumptions.
Insofar as a constraint conceived in terms of rational grounds
privileges one particular way of understanding, some people
object that it unfairly discriminates against other modes of
apprehension; but a more troubling practical worry arises out of
divergent opinions about what can be established rationally. A
good many people believe that the existence of a beneficent God
can be established rationally. Years ago, one of my sons had me
read a book that claimed that by proof of miracles and accurate
prophecies, the Bible established itself as the infallible word of
God and showed that Jesus was the Son of God. Any constraint
of public reasons is to operate as a self-restraint. If people
agreed that they should rely only on rational grounds, they would
28 See Jeffrey Reiman, Abortion, Natural Law, and Liberal Discourse: A Response to
John Finnis, in GEORGE & WOLFE, supra note 21, at 107, 109-10 ("What is ruled out is
forcing people to live this way or that, beyond what is needed to protect every sane adult's
chances of living as he or she sees fit.").
29 See Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
215, 230 (1987) (referring to grounds of decision that "can be shown to be justifiable from
a more impersonal standpoint").
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still disagree vigorously about what rational grounds could
establish. The author who thought that he could rationally
establish the infallibility of the Bible would feel free to rely on
biblical passages; others who believed that the recognition of
biblical truth depends on faith could not rely on the same
passages, though they might be no less certain the passages
represent God's true word.
The most appealing single category of claims that do not count
as ones of public reason are those based on comprehensive views,
overarching philosophies of life.30 According to Rawls, people
resolving constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice
should rely neither on religious perspectives nor on secular
philosophies, such as utilitarianism or the view that human
autonomy is the most fundamental good.31
We need to recognize that what people will sacrifice if they
forego reliance on comprehensive views will be uneven. A
utilitarian will give up less than a Christian fundamentalist,
because the specific arguments a utilitarian makes do not depend
on his utilitarian premises in the way that would be true for the
fundamentalist. Thus, Dr. Baltimore's argument about the great
potential medical benefits of stem-cell research lies within
premises that are shared in the society. It is also the kind of
argument a utilitarian makes. Granted, a utilitarian has a
particular device for weighing reasons, the greatest happiness
principle (or some similar principle) and he has a basis for
excluding some possible grounds; but all the reasons a utilitarian
will be likely to suggest for or against a policy are likely to fall
within the domain of arguments that people accept independent
of their comprehensive views. That certainly is not true for much
30 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 62 ("There is no reason.., why any citizen, or
association of citizens, should have the right to use the state's police power to decide
constitutional essentials or basic questions of justice as that person's, or that
association's, comprehensive doctrine directs.").
31 If someone's comprehensive view reflects his overarching approach to life, how can
he possibly be expected not to rely on it? Rawls's answer to this question is a two-level
approach: People with a variety of comprehensive views will coalesce around the premise
that liberal democracy is a desirable form of government. A feature of liberal democracy is
resolving political questions in a way that is detached from people's comprehensive views.
Thus, a person's comprehensive view calls on him to accept a political arrangement in
which issues are resolved without direct reference to comprehensive views. There is
nothing illogical about this arrangement, as we can see clearly if we imagine people of
different religious convictions who agree upon principles of religious liberty and
separation of church and state, including a principle that officials will not resolve issues
based on their own understanding of religious truti.
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a religious fundamentalist holds true. This inequality of sacrifice
is troubling but it may be acceptable if we have good reasons to
exclude comprehensive views from the domain of politics.
To recapitulate, what are not public reasons? We have looked
at grounds that are not widely accepted, conceptions of the good,
grounds that are not rational, and comprehensive views.
Although the most plausible single criterion for what reasons are
public is that they do not rest on comprehensive views, we should
be open to the possibility that more than one of these criteria
might count. We should also be open to the possibility that some
reasons may be more or less public, rather than public or not.
V. DIFFICULTIES IN CLASSIFYING NATURAL LAW ARGUMENTS
Recognizing that the very concept of public reasons is far from
unproblematic, we turn now to some perplexities in discerning
what should count as reasons that are public, focusing
particularly on natural law arguments such as Professor George's
argument that the embryo is a human being.
We may start with this thought by Robert George and
Christopher Wolfe:
On the one hand, if "public reason" is interpreted broadly...
, then natural law theorists believe that natural law theory
is nothing more or less than the philosophy of public
reason.... On the other hand, if "public reason" is
interpreted in the narrower sense ... [which] generally
excludes reliance on "comprehensive" moral, philosophical,
and religious doctrines[,] then natural law theorists reject
the idea. 32
Although this sentence captures a large measure of truth, I
think we can delve more deeply into which aspects of natural-law
reasoning might qualify as public reasons, under various
approaches to public reason.
John Courtney Murray, the most widely read American
theorist of natural law in the twentieth century, and a drafter of
the Second Vatican Council's statement on religious liberty,
32 GEORGE & WOLFE, supra note 21, at 1, 2.
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claimed in his book We Hold These Truths33 that American
traditions and natural law understanding coalesce. He urged
that the American political community is based on a tradition of
natural law and natural rights, resting on a belief that the people
as a whole are inwardly governed by the recognized imperatives
of the universal moral law. 34 The American consensus implies
"that there are truths that we hold in common, and a natural law
that makes known to all of us the structure of the moral
universe."35 Natural law reasoning best articulates the principles
of this consensus, although they can be fully understood only by
the wise. According to Murray, therefore, a natural law approach
provides the best-reasoned foundation for the public philosophy
of our society, and its government. Rather than analyzing how
Murray's understanding would look in light of more recent
theorizing about public reason, I shall suggest a number of
distinctions regarding natural law theories, trying to discern how
far claims of natural law might fall within a domain of public
reason. For this exercise, I am assuming that claims might be
disqualified as public reasons because they do not rest on
rational grounds, because they are based on controversial ideas
of the good, or because they are aspects of comprehensive
views.36
The distinctions regarding natural law that seem important
are these: (1) nonreligious understandings of natural law
principles contrasted with religious understandings; (2) the
theoretical premises of natural law approaches contrasted with
practical ways to resolve moral problems; (3) teleological
understandings of morality contrasted with the idea that basic
moral premises are self-evident; (4) rational derivation of moral
conclusions contrasted with judgments based on the fruits of
experience; (5) moral claims that are dependent on ideas of a
good life contrasted with those that are independent of those
ideas; (6) conclusions susceptible to universal understanding
3 3 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (Sheed and Ward 1960).
34 See MURRAY, supra note 33, at 36 (contrasting this belief with highly voluntaristic
accounts of natural rights).
35 MURRAY, supra note 33, at 40.3 6 We need to remember that if important natural law claims are disqualified, that does
not necessarily mean that they do not belong in politics given the controversial status of
any theory that citizens or officials should constrain themselves to rely on public reasons.
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contrasted with those that only the wise can grasp; (7)
understanding that is independent of time and place contrasted
with understanding that develops according to time and culture.
These distinctions can contribute to analytical clarity, but I
definitely do not mean to suggest that every version of natural
law theory or every particular moral claim comes down neatly on
one side or the other of the dichotomies. 37
A. Religious Understanding or Not
The close association between Roman Catholicism and the
natural law tradition leads some outsiders to suppose that
natural law is an essentially religious view about law and
morality, but that is contrary to what most modern natural law
theorists claim. They contend that, in some sense, morality is
universal and that fundamental moral norms can be grasped by
people whatever their religious traditions and opinions. 38
Natural lawyers within the Christian tradition have believed
that Scripture and church teachings complement what we can
discern by natural reason, and some believe that a relatively few
moral duties are discoverable only from religious sources; but
these views alone do not disqualify natural law arguments from
being ones of public reason. 39 Various Protestant theologians and
a few Roman Catholic ones have challenged this universalist
natural law view as failing to be distinctly Christian; for them, a
Christian ethic should depend upon Christian sources and a
37 For example, insofar as we can differentiate between rational derivation from basic
premises and reliance on the fruits of experience, a theorist might believe both are highly
relevant to drawing sound moral conclusions.
38 See JEAN PORTER, NATURAL AND DIVINE LAW: RECLAIMING THE TRADITION FOR
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 29-30 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ'g 1999) (describing Catholic version of
natural law: "Because moral norms are grounded in human nature, which is the same
everywhere, they are accessible to all reasonable men and women without the necessity of
revelation."); see also YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW: A PHILOSOPHER'S
REFLECTIONS 125-36 (Vukan Kuic ed., Fordham Univ. Press 1965) (explaining that
natural laws are premises that all societies grasp, but from which they may draw
different moral conclusions); see also GEORGE & WOLFE, supra note 21, at 56 (describing
view held by natural law theorists: "basic moral norms are widely known, though in some
cases they or their more specific applications may be obscured by wayward passions or
corrupt customs or habits.").
39 A full analysis needs to take account of people whose certainty about resolution of a
moral issue is increased because of religious sources or whose sense of the validity of a
natural law conclusion is based on religious sources, but I leave aside these nuances here.
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Christian world view.40  Jean Porter's study of scholastic
philosophers and theologians shows that they drew a less sharp
distinction between natural reason and religious sources of
insight than modern natural lawyers tend to do. 4 1 She suggests
that the scholastic approach has much to teach us about ethical
understanding.42  Whatever the intrinsic soundness of the
approach Porter reports and recommends, reasoning and
conclusions that depend on specifically Christian sources do not
satisfy requirements of public reason, as elaborated by modern
theorists.
B. Overall Theory or Ways of Reasoning about Moral and
Political Problems
Most natural law theorists have provided accounts of human
good and moral duty within an overall perspective about
fundamental reality.43 Typically, the theorists have connected
human existence to the rest of the physical universe, in which all
objects, or all living objects, have a natural inclination to fulfill
their essential purposes.44 In this teleological view of life, human
beings share some purposes with animals, and perhaps some
even with plants and stones, but they have a higher purpose than
all other earthly beings. That purpose is to realize their rational
nature. In many versions, God is a crucial element in this
structure of being. When natural-law claims rest directly upon
assertions about God, or upon a complete theory of natural
40 See PORTER, supra note 38, at 30-34 (reviewing criticisms of natural law raised by
Reinhold Niebuhr, Stanley Hauerwas, Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan and James
Gustafson, among others); see also PORTER, supra note 38, at 168-72 (discussing criticisms
of natural law raised by Karl Barth, who is described as believing that "an adequate
account of morality must be not only theological but specifically and distinctively
Christological.").
41 The scholastics used Scripture to determine which aspects of nature to treat as
normative, and they used their understanding of nature and reason to interpret
Scripture. Rather than forming two complementary tracks to moral understanding,
religious interpretation and natural reason interpenetrated each other. See PORTER,
supra note 38, at 129-40.
42 See PORTER, supra note 38, at 303-17 (suggesting that moral reflection is theological
yet "remains open to the best insights of the natural and social sciences").
43 See generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 55-60 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1987).
44 See PORTER, supra note 38, at 70 (quoting a "highly influential definition" of natural
law made by Ulpian, a Roman jurist: "The law of nature is that which nature teaches all
animals. For that law is not proper to the human race, but it is common to all animals
which are born on the earth and in the sea, and to the birds also.").
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reality, they are based on a comprehensive view in Rawls' sense.
But that need not disqualify every moral and political argument
made by natural lawyers from being consonant with public
reason.
The complete relation between full natural law theories and
their bases of moral reasoning is complex, but here is how moral
claims might escape depending on a comprehensive view. Most
natural-law accounts claim that people do (descriptively) reach
common judgments about basic moral issues and that these
judgments are sound.45 So long as a theorist believes that people
can reason to sound moral judgments without understanding or
accepting any overall theory that explains how these judgments
fit with physical reality or God's purposes, then the moral
arguments the theorist presents might qualify as public reasons,
even though his complete theory definitely does not.46
Notice, in this respect, that Professor George made his appeal
without explicitly relying on any comprehensive natural law
theory. If his contention about the status of an embryo can be
detached from such a theory, it could be a public reason not to
engage in stem-cell research.47
C. Teleology or Self-Evidence
The traditional understanding of natural law is built on a
purposive sense of nature; as an acorn develops into an oak,
things have a tendency to fulfill their essential purposes. Human
beings live good lives if they fulfill their true purposes; the norms
that they should observe help them realize their essential nature.
To take a practical example, we might discern that the essential
purpose of human sexuality is procreation. We could proceed to
condemn masturbation, homosexual relations, and the use of
artificial contraceptives as unnatural deviations from
45 There is substantial variation in how much common reason reaches. Compare
PORTER, supra note 38, at 29-30 (describing Catholic version of natural law, which holds
that the same moral norms are accessible to all persons), with SIMON, supra note 38, at 3-
5, 23-26, 66, 146-48 (expressing skeptical view about how much is really shared in
common).
46 See SIMON, supra note 38, at 62 (speaking of acquaintance with natural law as being
logically antecedent to knowledge of God's existence, although understanding of natural
law is preserved only by recognizing God as its ultimate foundation).
47 However, when a natural law theorist advances a moral claim, it may be very
difficult to decide just how far the claim can fairly be detached from his overall theory.
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appropriate sexual acts. This theoretical approach has been
challenged by Germain Grisez and John Finnis,48 and by Robert
George, although their own conclusions about practical moral
issues differ little from those whose teleological approach they
reject. Their account unties moral understanding from any
theory of physical reality. Rather, human beings are capable of
identifying certain goods as self-evidently valuable. From this
identification of basic goods and from recognition that none has
priority over others, we can ascertain what actions are morally
right or morally wrong.
Our question is whether either of these approaches is
intrinsically more susceptible of providing public reasons than
the other. Insofar as the teleological theory rests on broad claims
about purpose in nature, it certainly amounts to a comprehensive
view in Rawls' sense. 49 No doubt, the Grisez-Finnis-George
approach is also a comprehensive view, but it does not follow that
every moral claim made from that perspective must rest on the
comprehensive view. Professor George, for example, might argue
that his particular claim about the embryos is self-evidently
correct, and can be seen to be so by people who need not accept
the idea that self-evident truths lie at the core of moral
understanding. 50
48 The explication with which I am most conversant is JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980), which I reviewed in 10 POL. THEORY 133 (1981). In a book that is
critical of this approach, Russell Hittinger examines its major claims in detail and refers
to many writings of its defenders. See generally RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE
NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987).
49 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 175 ("A doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers
all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of
thought; whereas a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises certain
(but not all) nonpolitical values and is rather loosely articulated.").
50 Rawls has talked about people relying on practices of common sense and science. See
John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 539 (1980). Such a
reliance does not stray from public reason. George talks about his conclusion as based on
science, but the scientific evidence alone does not tell us how the embryo should be
valued. If George conceded as much, he might still contend that his conclusion that an
entity capable of development through internal organic functioning into a human being is
a human being is a conclusion of common sense (albeit a kind of rarified common sense).
Conceivably, a teleological theorist could advance similar arguments that some claims
about basic human purposes, such as preserving life, rest on a shared common sense; but,
in general, claims within a teleological perspective seem to rest more directly on a
comprehensive view than claims asserted as self-evident.
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D. Rational Derivations or the Fruits of Experience
How are we to draw correct moral conclusions? Various
natural law theorists have emphasized rational derivations from
first principles or insights from human experience. I do not want
to overstate the dichotomy. Everyone agrees that reflection on
experience is a vital aspect of understanding moral truth, and no
one rejects rational analysis that moves from general truths to
particulars. But, nevertheless, some theorists rely much more
heavily on rational derivations than do others. Many modern
natural lawyers, both those who maintain a teleological
perspective and those who start from self-evidence, draw highly
controversial conclusions from supposedly irresistible first
principles. To take just one example, the natural purposes or
self-evident values of human sexuality are said to lead to a
conclusion that persons who are powerfully inclined from birth to
homosexual rather than heterosexual relations should refrain
from sexual acts altogether, rather than engage in the only
sexual acts that attract them.51
In the abstract, rational derivation is fully consonant with
public reason. After all, if one begins with a valid first principle
and draws from it by rigorous analysis, one's conclusions are
rationally compelling. Regrettably, what for some natural law
thinkers are unassailable first principles and irrefutable
derivations strike many outsiders as uncongenial abstractions
that have lost sight of the human condition. If we were focusing
exclusively on this feature of claimed rational derivation, the
proponent of a position about sexual behavior might think his
view falls within the domain of public reasons; an outsider might
find that the position is not only unpersuasive on balance but
that it appeals to an esoteric set of assumptions rather than any
common reason.
The more modest approach of reliance on human experience
may fall more indisputably within the range of public reason, at
least if the reliance on experience is of a certain kind. Someone
who examines the morality of incest by surveying the norms of
various cultures and psychological studies of family relations
begins with the evidence of social science. If he concludes that,
51 I have criticized this position. See Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive Is Natural Law
Theory?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1647, 1666-71 (2000).
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even apart from genetic hazards and the unacceptability of
sexual relations with minors, incestual sexual relations carry
very serious risks to family life, and are therefore rightly
regarded as immoral, that judgment falls more easily within the
domain of public reasons than the top-down reasoning one finds
in some natural law approaches.
E. Dependent on Ideas of the Good or Not
Natural law theory has developed notions of morality out of
judgments about what are fulfilling lives for human beings.5 3
Were public reason to exclude all ideas of the good, it would
disqualify most claims of natural law.5 4 Undoubtedly, the natural
lawyer's best response is that no sensible version of public
reasons should exclude claims about the good life. The natural
lawyer might acknowledge that controversial claims of the good
may be excluded, but say that his claims about the good life are
uncontroversial. Faced with the indisputable fact that many
natural law claims about good lives are controversial, he might
claim that he begins with uncontroversial claims about the good
life and derives his controversial conclusions by a chain of
rationally persuasive arguments. In form, this argument has
considerable appeal, but if we look at most practical examples,
we find either that the initial premises are controversial or that
the derivation of conclusions does not seem rationally compelling
to outsiders, even ones who are fair and open-minded. 55
F. Universal Understanding or Understanding of the Wise
Although natural law theorists have claimed that some kind of
moral understanding is universal, it has not followed that
53 See MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTIcAL RATIONALITY 46 (2001) (noting
that natural law theorists claim that individuals act to increase their well-being). This
characterization fits both teleological and self-evidence approaches.
54 Interestingly, Professor George's particular argument about stem-cell research does
not rest on a controversial notion of a good life, or perhaps on any notion of a good life.
Professor George's main argument, based on science and what we should reasonably
conclude about an entity that can develop into an adult person, is about who counts as a
human being. That argument is more about right or justice, the required respect for
persons, than it is about what constitutes a good life.
55 This very disagreement about what can be persuasively derived from
uncontroversial premises might be used to bolster the contention that only
uncontroversial conclusions about the good life qualify as public reasons, not controversial
conclusions purportedly derived from uncontroversial premises.
2007]
STJOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
ordinary people can resolve complex moral questions on their
own. How to resolve some difficult problems can be grasped only
by the wise. 56 This role for the wise is not a serious difficulty for
public reason if the wise can explain their initial conclusions in a
way that all the rest of us will understand is convincing, or if the
wise are a group conveniently identified by public reason. If all
of us understand the conclusions the wise reach, their reasoning
is what convinces us, even if we lacked the insight to reach those
conclusions by ourselves. But our understanding might not be
essential. For many matters, notably scientific ones, most people
depend on the judgments of experts, and they are not able to
evaluate why the experts are right. So long as the experts can be
identified in some objective way, relying on what they say is
consonant with a reliance on public reason.
If reliance on scientific experts fits with public reason, why
should not the same be true for reliance on the wise for moral
and political judgments? We can see two related possible
objections. One is that in deciding what is right morally and
politically (insofar as that does not depend on scientific
understanding about what is true descriptively), people should
rely on their own judgments, not those of experts. On this
account, a moral argument that is so complicated that only the
wise can understand it falls outside the domain of public
reasons.5 7 A second objection is that we have no confident way to
identify the morally wise. This objection seems to me crucial to
deciding that moral conclusions that only the wise may perceive
are not within the domain of public reasons. 58
56 We can imagine a view that ordinary people resolve moral issues just as well as
anyone else, but that they are incapable of rationalizing and theorizing their insights as
well as the most intelligent and highly trained among us. But the role of the wise in much
natural law theory goes beyond this. That view, which fits well within the notion that
reason is the distinctive human characteristic, is that the wise are better capable of
resolving moral issues than the less wise.
57 For a suggestion that arguments should be discounted if they are extremely difficult
to assess and are subject to reasonable disagreement see Stephen Macedo, In Defense of
Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases, in GEORGE & WOLFE, supra
note 21, at 23.
58 If almost everyone could agree on who was wise, and the basis for that agreement
was itself a matter of public reason, then we would have a good public reason to accept a
consensus of the wise.
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G. Understanding Independent of Time and Place or
Understanding Dependent on Time and Place
To draw a stark contrast, one can imagine a moral
understanding that is more or less constant across times and
cultures or a moral understanding that develops and recedes in
context.59 On the second view, explaining how anyone could ever
have thought that slavery was consonant with natural law
becomes easier; but that view renders one less confident that
conclusions reached now have any permanent validity. This
distinction, by itself, has little bearing on the issue of natural law
and public reason within a particular society, 60 although the
developing view fits more comfortably with a sense that the wise
have a special role.
If this quick survey of natural law perspectives and arguments
and their relation to ideas of public reason suggests a great deal
of complexity that indeed is the point. With a particular
argument by a natural lawyer on some political issue, we (and
she) might doubt how much the argument depended on religious
premises, how closely it was tied to an overall theory that would
amount to a comprehensive view, whether it was self-evident in a
way that would make it part of the stock of common reasons,
whether any claimed derivations from higher premises followed
in the way the argument asserted, whether it rests on a
controversial idea of the good, and whether it could be
understood by ordinary people or only the wise. We can imagine
that even if a speaker and listener agreed on the standards for
determining if reasons are public, they might disagree over
whether a particular argument by the speaker qualified. We can
also imagine that many arguments might not seem to be sharply
public or sharply nonpublic, but to fall into some gray area of
arguably public or more or less public. Finally, we can imagine
that the problem of classification is still more difficult because
there is uncertainty about what the criteria are for reasons being
public. As difficult as it may be to say whether any particular
argument is in or out of the domain of public reasons,
59 Simon adopts a strong version of the second view. See SIMON, supra note 38, at 161-
63 (arguing that our knowledge of natural law develops gradually with progression of
human nature).
60 That is, one could believe that natural law arguments are ones of public reason
within a culture even if they are substantially conditioned by time and place.
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generalizing across the wide range of natural law arguments is
virtually impossible.
If natural law arguments are this hard to classify, we can
expect the same to be true of many other approaches to moral
and political questions that do not depend on explicit religious
perspectives. We might find that many reasons and arguments
seem to be more or less public rather than public or not. We
might also wonder if the appropriate degree of publicness of
arguments depends on the circumstances. What might be
insufficiently public for the preamble of a statute may be
sufficiently public in a speech by a senator to her constituents.
VI. LAW AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF PUBLIC REASONS
We might be drawn to an even more skeptical conclusion:
namely, that whatever other virtues it may have, a theory of
public reasons founders completely on the impossibility of
specifying just what reasons are public. But standing against
this skeptical rejection of any ideal of public reasons is the law.
Is not the law, and I mean here assessment of what the law
provides, a domain in which a theory of public reasons is
realized? If so, does not that raise the possibility that politics
could be a domain of public reason? Rawls talks about the
Supreme Court's work as an exemplar of the use of public
reason,61 and it is certainly true that some reasons that count
outside the law count for less or do not count at all inside the
law. I initially supposed that what Rawls said about the law was
uncontroversial, that law is an area in which a theory of public
reasons applies, and that the difficult question is whether the
limited stock of reasons within the law has any bearing on the
broader realm of politics. But I have found surprising resistance
to the idea that law is a domain of public reasons.
Everyone seems to agree that some reasons that might carry
weight outside the law do not count when judges interpret
statutes or constitutions or develop the common law. Thus, a
Roman Catholic judge would not render a decision on the basis
that it accords with the stance taken in a Papal encyclical. 62
61 See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 235.
62 However, reference to the encyclical might be made as evidence that all major
religious traditions unite in taking a certain view.
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Within the law, judges are supposed to rely on reasons that have
force for other judges, and the reasons need to be accessible, both
in the sense of being comprehensible and in the sense of being
capable of being grasped on the basis of rational thought, not
faith or intuition. So the law limits relevant reasons; it requires
that reasons be understood by rational analysis and have a force
that is generally understood. These seem to be strong credentials
for our law being a regime of public reasons.
Just how many reasons lie wholly outside the law for various
kinds of legal issues is debatable. But even if the discrepancy
between reasons that count in politics and reasons that count in
law is not large, particular reasons have different weight within
and without the law. An argument that a particular result will
be more just or will make people happier may have some weight
when judges interpret statutes, but it will not carry the day if the
language of a statute clearly requires a contrary conclusion.
Perhaps the most significant difference between reasoning within
the law and reasoning in politics has to do with the special
weight that certain reasons have in law, especially reasons
concerning textual meaning, legislative intent, and the force of
precedents, and the diminished weight accorded other reasons.
In any event, we may say that in some imprecise way, leaving
room for debate over many specific examples, that some reasons
that can carry force outside the law do not carry force for legal
interpretation, and that the weight of many other reasons is
sharply affected by whether one is talking about personal
judgment or legislative policy, as contrasted with legal
interpretation.
What might be said against the proposition that the law is a
system of public reasons, a system in which people are supposed
to rely on reasons that have a general or public force and in
which many reasons are disqualified or diminished? Skeptics
have put the point something like this: The law allows all
reasons to count that are made relevant by the law. One need
not ask about what reasons are public reasons but what reasons
the law makes relevant."63 So put, the challenge seems a matter
63 This is my paraphrase of a position taken by some participants during a May 2001
conference at Catholic University on public reason.
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of conceptual labeling, 64 but I believe a deeper question lies
beneath it. The deeper question is the manner in which one
resolves what reasons the law allows. My response is that the
manner in which one determines whether the law allows some
reasons is very similar to how one might decide what reasons
count as public for political life.
We might imagine two contrasting ways in which to resolve
which reasons the law admits. One way would be to see the law
as a distinctive endeavor that has its own peculiar strategy to
identify what reasons count. It is as if we said that the reasons
that are relevant to settle disputes in tennis are the reasons
supplied by the rule book of tennis. Then we would have a
limited stock of reasons, comprehensible reasons that carry force
for every decision maker, but all this would be a consequence of
the narrow coverage of the rule book.65 That tennis has a limited
stock of comprehensible reasons with force for all decision-
makers would tell us hardly anything about public reason in
politics, about why people might eschew otherwise persuasive
reasons for laws and policies.
An alternative way that one might resolve whether the law
admits reasons is to ask whether otherwise persuasive reasons
for reaching decisions are (or should be) excluded because they do
not meet some requisite degree of publicness. If the answer were
yes, if this were how we decided what reasons the law excludes,
we would have an example of public reasons that could be
relevant for politics. In that event, the assertion that the law
makes some reasons relevant and other reasons irrelevant would
be quite consistent with the conclusion that the law is a regime of
public reasons.
Without doubt, the distinctive character of law and the
authoritative sources of law lead to some reasons counting within
the law and others counting little or not at all in many contexts.
For example, the practice that misguided precedents are deemed
to have force is an aspect of common law jurisprudence. To this
extent, the law is not so unlike tennis governed largely according
64 My response to the formal distinction between reasons the law allows and public
reasons is that the distinction itself is indecisive about every important normative issue.
65 In fact, I doubt if tennis or any similar game (I put aside board games) could be
completely self-contained in this way; general notions of fairness, for example, would be
bound to affect interpretation; but most of the reasons that count in tennis might be
derived from the rule book.
[Vol. 22:2
RELIGIOUSLYBASED JUDGMENTS
to the rule book. But lawyers may usually argue to judges that,
in an otherwise close case, one interpretation of a precedent or a
reading of a statute will promote justice or human welfare better
than another. In fact, the domain of relevant arguments in law is
not much narrower than the domain of relevant arguments in
politics, although, as I have said, differences in weight are
critical. 66 The considerations that determine whether reasons are
excluded resemble those that have been suggested for political
life by proponents of public reason.
The point is easiest to illustrate for determinations that judges
must make that do not depend much on authoritative statutes or
precedents. In virtually all states, the main standard for
determinations of child custody is the best interests of the
child.67 Suppose a judge must decide whether to place a child
with her father or with her mother, who is living with another
woman in an intimate relationship. The judge should not refuse
custody to the mother because the Bible condemns homosexual
relations as sinful. Nor should the judge announce the truth of
greatest happiness utilitarianism as the basis for resolving what
is in the child's best interest. The basis for excluding these
possible reasons is very similar to the arguments put forward by
public reasons theorists in respect to politics: the reasons do not
have appropriately general force and they rely too heavily on
controversial overarching views.
All this is sufficient to suggest that the law is not only a
domain of limited reasons, 68 but that part of the basis for
66 It is sufficient for my argument that it is correct for common law, even if, contrary to
what I believe, reasons of justice and desirability are properly excluded in statutory or
constitutional interpretation, or both.
67 See 24A Am. Jur. 2D Divorce and Separation § 931 (1998).
68 If we ask just what reasons count in law and how much they count, we face
difficulties like those that troubled the examination of natural law and public reason.
Notably, Supreme Court Justices disagree about the relevance of legislative history in
statutory cases, and related to this is an apparent disagreement whether the subjective
intentions of legislators matter. One theory of common law development is that judges
should very heavily rely on community norms. See generally MELVIN EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (Harvard Univ. Press1991). Another theory is that they
should forthrightly interpret in light of their own judgments about justice. See generally
LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6. People who agree that certain arguments are relevant may
disagree greatly about how much weight these should carry in relation to other
arguments. Thus, our law is hardly a model of a regime in which telling arguments are
neatly lined up with their appropriate weight. But all this does not deprive it of being a
domain of public reasons, in which some arguments are acknowledged not to be valid
because these arguments fail to exhibit sufficient publicness, and the force of other
arguments may be diminished because they seem less public than alternative arguments.
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deciding what reasons are included and excluded has to do with
determining which reasons are public. If the law is a domain of
public reasons, then it is at least possible that in politics, people
do have, or should have, a sense that reasons should be public,
and it is possible that that sense could strengthen and sharpen
over time, or that it could dissipate in the face of challenges that
God should not be removed from the public square. As I have
said, my own sense is that the constraint of public reason applies
primarily to the public expressions of officials, and that saying
just what count as public reasons in various contexts is no simple
matter.
VII. PUBLIC REASONS, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Our treatment of public reasons may seem to have wandered
far from the constitutional principle that no law should be
adopted that establishes religion. The crucial connection is that
whatever other reasons may be nonpublic, it is widely assumed
that religious reasons fall within that amorphous category.
According to a theory of public reasons, if laws are adopted based
mainly on the religious convictions of citizens and officials,
something has gone wrong from the standpoint of liberal political
philosophy, and that impropriety may well be considered a kind
of establishment of religion. No one thinks that because some
citizens and officials have relied upon religious convictions,
resulting laws actually violate the Establishment Clause as a
matter of law. But conceivably if enough officials rely mainly on
their religious convictions or those of the constituents, laws are
invalid, and should be so declared by courts.
The part of this essay devoted to the uncertain boundaries of
public reasons does not directly touch the status of reliance on
the Bible or on church authority-those are unpublic in the
relevant sense-but it affects that reliance in a more complicated
way. Any minimally fair theory of public reasons cannot include
religious reasons and no other reasons. If religious reasons are
to be "excluded" then other reasons that are similarly not
rational or based on comprehensive views must also be excluded.
If one is hard put 'to explain just what other reasons are
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nonpublic, that casts doubt on whether it is fair to insist that
good citizens and officials not rely on religious reasons.
The earlier part of the essay summarizing my own limited,
"intermediate," account of the constraints of public reasons
provides a more decisive response to extravagant claims about
the relevance of the Establishment Clause for this subject. It has
never been widely assumed in the course of the country's history
that people should refrain from relying on their religious
convictions when they consider the wisdom of proposed
legislation. Among other movements, arguments for abolition of
slavery, prohibition, and civil rights were substantially religious.
Neither widespread reliance on religious premises nor the active
involvement of religious groups should, alone, be regarded as
marking laws that violate the Establishment Clause, much less
as marking laws that courts should declare to violate the
Establishment Clause.
What remains is consideration whether certain, narrow,
connections of religion to laws that are adopted-connections
different from those that underlie typical violations of the
Establishment Clause-might render the laws unconstitutional.
It turns out that the constitutional consequences of legislative
and executive policies being grounded in religious premises are
very slight if one is focusing on what measures courts should hold
invalid, or so I shall argue. But the analysis leading to this
conclusion can help dispel confusions about the relation between
political rhetoric and judicially enforceable constitutional law. It
can also enable those who would like the courts to play a more
active role to see exactly how they differ from those who reject
such a role.
The overarching question in this section is which laws and
policies violate the Establishment Clause because they rest on
religious premises. The question mainly has cogency in respect
to legally enforced morality; but to understand why this is so, we
need to clear away various matters that are not at issue.
Most Establishment Clause problems involve tangible
assistance to religious groups or government sponsorship of
religious ideas. Government assistance can be open, as with
financial aid to religious charities, or covert, as when a board
conceals its choosing of a highway route because it will benefit a
particular church. Government sponsorship of religion can be
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undeniable, as with devotional Bible reading in public schools
and the hiring of army chaplains, or it can be more subtle or
debatable, as with moments of silence and "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance. If the obvious and dominant purpose or a
"primary" effect is to aid religion, legislation is invalid under the
Establishment Clause.
As far as purpose is concerned, the Supreme Court has
declared invalid only those laws whose overriding objective was
to promote religion. One can certainly imagine stricter
approaches, ones under which more legislation would fail a
purpose test. A court might ask whether a religious aim was
influential or whether a statute would have been adopted in the
absence of religious objectives. Suppose that in the open
proceedings of a five-member highway board, two members of the
board voted for Route C, which would have gone thirty miles
from the Baptist church, one member who voted for Route A said
she would have voted for Route C except that she wanted to aid
the church and its members, and two other members said they
preferred A on a number of grounds, one of which was that it
would aid the Baptists. In these circumstances, we could say
that the religious aim was influential and that the decision
would (almost certainly) have been different without it. In
deciding whether a worker had been improperly fired because of
his race or religion, a court might employ such an approach, not
allowing the firing to stand if it probably was a consequence of
discrimination. And I believe that if an individual legislator
votes for a bill only for a religious reason, that would render a
statute invalid if it was the reason of every legislator; the
individual legislator has violated the Establishment Clause. 69
But the Supreme Court has been very clear that it will not
engage in such nuanced inquiries. On the understanding that
courts should accord deference to legislatures, it has required
that promoting religion be the evident dominant purpose if
legislation is to fail the purpose test.
The legislative measures we will now consider do not mainly
promote religious groups or religious perspectives. They do not
give religions tangible aid and they do not encourage people to
69 One might fairly resist this conclusion and say the legislator has violated only the
spirit of the clause.
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adopt any particular view about religion. What they do, to put it
starkly, is to force nonadherents to behave in ways that those
with particular religious views think they should behave. Thus,
laws that forbade people from engaging in sexual acts with
others of the same gender were not intended to convert to a
religious view; rather, they were aimed at making people comply
with a moral standard, or, to put it differently, at preventing
people from falling into sin.
For analytical purposes, it helps initially to assume that every
legislator has the same attitude about a law and that this shared
attitude is spread on the record for all to see. What attitudes run
counter to the Establishment Clause? Religious convictions that
underlie reasons to vote might function in one of at least five
different ways: (1) Among entities that undoubtedly deserve the
protection of the state, religious convictions are the basis for
determining what is a just distribution of resources, privileges,
and penalties. Into this category could fall laws regarding welfare
for the poor and authorizing, or not authorizing, capital
punishment. (2) The crucial question is whether entities of some
kind deserve serious protection, and religious convictions
determine the answer. Arguments based on religious authority
for a law against use of embryonic stem cells (because embryos
are human beings) or against scientific experimentation with
animals fall into this category. (3) Religious convictions
determine judgments whether actions will harm persons other
than consenting adults who are most directly involved. One
argument against incestuous marriage is that the knowledge
that such marriage is possible among adults will have a
detrimental effect on family relations while children are still
minors (e.g., a brother and sister may relate differently to each
other, and in a less healthy way, if they realize they can marry
each other when they are old enough). A person might believe
this argument is persuasive only because a sacred text condemns
incest. (4) Religious convictions are the basis to decide that
actions will harm the adults who choose to perform them. A
person's religious beliefs might lead him to think that
homosexual relations are bound to be psychologically damaging
to participants, damaging according to ordinary assessments of
psychological health. (5) Religious convictions are a basis to
judge acts as wrongful, though without any harm as conceived by
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nonreligious standards. A person might oppose homosexual acts
in the face of powerful evidence that they do not cause ordinary
physical and psychological damage, on the basis that they
constitute sins in the eyes of God (perhaps to be punished in
some form of afterlife).
We should not be surprised that argument about this topic
tends to focus mainly on my last two categories, usually without
a distinction being drawn between them. I shall concentrate on
these as well, but I first explain why the first three categories are
also important and are different. Normative questions about
what entities deserve protection and about what justice requires
for these entities are not matters of simple fact. In a liberal
democratic society, there will be wide agreement about some of
these questions. All or virtually all human beings who have been
born and are now alive warrant protection, and justice for people
within a society requires some form of equal treatment. At the
edges, there is controversy. What protection should be given to
animals, to the environment (for its own sake), and to embryos?
How far should the state assist the less fortunate? Should
capital punishment be available as a penalty? As to these
matters, disagreements hardly fall out with religious opinions
lined up neatly on one side and secular opinions on the opposite
one. Various religious people have different views. It would be
hard to trace any particular position a legislature might adopt
directly to religious convictions. It is true that most people in the
United States now who want to protect embryos are people of
religious faith, but, as we have seen with Professor Robert
George's argument against stem cell research, many of these
people also believe that one need not rely on religious premises to
justify that protection.
Two other aspects about issues of justice and the borders of
protection strike me as very important. For many of these
issues, rational analysis is highly indecisive. 70 In making up
their minds about whether to protect higher mammals,
everybody will rely to an extent on nonrational (I do not say
irrational) intuitions. Were citizens and officials permitted to
rely on nonreligious intuitions but not to rely on religious
70 in RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, supra note 2, I make an
extended argument along these lines about animals, the environment, the status of a
fetus, and some issues of just distribution.
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convictions, that would constitute a form of implicit
discrimination against religious perspectives. Moreover, any
religious individual would have a hard time saying where his
religious convictions left off and what his intuitions would tell
him apart from these convictions.
The other crucial aspect of our first two categories concerns the
rationale for regulating behavior. Suppose it were true that only
those with particular religious convictions believed that the state
should protect dolphins, and they managed to get a law adopted
that prohibited the killing of dolphins. Their aim would not be to
promote a religion or even to prevent sin, but to protect entities
that deserve protection. It would be odd to think that it should
be impermissible for society to protect dolphins, even if the great
majority of its members holds the religious view that they
deserve that protection.71 When the issue is the distribution of
benefits and burdens, the analysis of legislative aims is typically
similar. It is not that those adopting a law particularly want to
control behavior to make sure it is moral; rather, they want to
see that people (and other protected entities) get the benefits
they deserve and share burdens fairly.
Although arguments against restrictive abortion laws are often
cast as ones about immoral behavior, and thus not so different
from arguments about laws restricting sexual behavior, in fact
the most powerful argument for a restrictive law is quite
different. It involves, first, a claim that at the moment of
conception, or at some later stage, the embryo, or fetus, deserves
protection. (Often this point is put in terms that the fetus is a
human being, implying that the fetus deserves as much
protection as a full human being, but someone might believe a
fetus deserves significant protection from the state though less
than does a full human being.) The protection is of the kind that
would benefit the fetus from any point of view. It concerns
physical survival. The second part of the argument is one about
justice, about burdens and benefits. The innocent fetus should be
protected even if the cost is that the pregnant woman must carry
71 One might take a different view if the reasons for protection are actually at odds
with what rational, secular morality might indicate-if, for example, the species that
received special protection had much lower capacities than some other species but was
thought by some to be favored by God. I discuss this possibility in RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, supra note 2, at 204-07.
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the fetus against her wishes and give birth to a baby she would
rather not have. Because the basic issues about abortion concern
disagreements about entities deserving protection and about the
degree to which fetuses should be protected if that impinges
severely on the liberty of persons who undoubtedly deserve
protection (i.e., pregnant women), any assertion that restrictive
laws about abortion violate the Establishment Clause is less
promising than similar assertions about laws more easily
classifiable as aimed at sin.
Our third category (like the fourth and fifth categories) mainly
involves primarily laws that are directly addressed at people who
together wish to perform a forbidden act. There is no immediate
innocent victim, as the fetus is an innocent victim in the eyes of
those who want restrictions on abortions. Often with respect to
such laws, people disagree about indirect harms. I have used the
example of incest. If we put aside the concern about the genetic
effects of inbreeding, which rest on a solid scientific base but
would not apply to incestuous marriages of couples unable to
conceive children together, we face a concern about the effect on
minor children within families who knew that they might
someday be eligible to marry a parent or sibling. Perhaps legal
permission would have extremely little effect, especially if social
taboos about incest remained strong. Were social scientists to
study the effect of the repeal of laws against incest on typical
family life, changes in attitudes would take time and claimed
causal relations would be disputable. And, of course, all anyone
could do in advance of such a legal change would be to make an
educated guess. A person might respond to this inevitable
uncertainty from the standpoint of social science by reasoning as
follows. "My religion firmly condemns incest. That is a strong
basis to conclude that legal acceptance of incest would harm
family life more broadly."
As I have put the point so far, the exact chain of inference from
religious basis to harm for families is inexact. Here are two
oversimplified stark alternatives: (1) "My religion condemns
incest. So also, I believe, do most other religions. Whatever the
theological truth of my religion, the rejection of incest probably
reflects a sound moral sense that it is destructive of family life."
(2) "My religion condemns incest. I believe my religion
accurately understands God's will. Since God forbids incest, that
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probably means it is destructive of family life." Were someone to
rely on the first chain of inference, that could hardly present a
problem for liberal political philosophy or the Establishment
Clause. If one looks to past societies to provide some evidence
what kinds of restrictions promote healthy social life, one could
hardly disregard what religious traditions have to say. 72 The
second chain of inference, relying on the truth of a particular
religion, is more questionable, but, if social science evidence is
substantially indeterminate, people should be able to rely on
religious convictions as well as nonreligious intuitions to fill in
their sense of the broad effects of proposed laws.73 If one believed,
contrary to my view, that in some way the Establishment Clause
was at odds with officials' relying on the second kind of inference,
that would still not provide a workable principle for courts to
invalidate laws under the Establishment Clause.
This leaves us with our last two categories, involving laws that
restrict behavior just because it is immoral or because it is
thought to harm the very people who choose to engage it. In
moving to these last two categories, we already are engaging in
deceptive oversimplification, because those who want to restrict
behavior as immoral almost always believe that behavior does
have corrosive effects on the broader society. But for clarity of
analysis, we can put claims about those effects aside.
Laws restricting sexual conduct among consenting adults
provide the main examples for these last two categories. We can
focus on laws against homosexual acts, against fornication, and
against bestiality, and on restrictions on marriage between
persons of the same gender. The Establishment Clause
argument against such laws is that they would not be adopted
were it not for people's religious convictions and that they,
therefore, amount to an establishment of religion. At least so
long as the proponents of the restrictions do not rely heavily on
claimed harm to innocent third parties, these laws differ from
72 If, however, one were to only rely on that first approach, one would need to be open
to moral assumptions of other religions, to evidence not from religious traditions, and to
the possibility that various restrictions have reflected indefensible oppression or outright
ignorance.
73 As a matter of liberal political philosophy, I am inclined to think they should not rely
in politics on factual judgments (grounded in religion) that are strongly opposed to what
the evidence of science and social science establishes. Thus, people who believe the world
will end five years from now should not press for government policies based on that
assumption. RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE, supra note 2, at 204-11.
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ones we have yet considered. They are not about borderlines of
status or about distributive justice;74 they are efforts to control
behavior because that behavior is regarded as intrinsically
wrongful.
Before engaging the main discussion, I need to defend my
inclusion of bestiality on this list and to note alternative routes to
constitutional protection of much of the behavior involved. When
the establishment claim is presented with respect to bestiality, it
is often answered that laws prohibiting sex between humans and
animals protect the animals from cruelty. I find that
implausible, whether it is offered as a causal explanation of why
such laws are adopted or as a justification for them. If a society
were mainly concerned with the welfare of animals, it would be
very odd to allow humans to kill them for almost any reason and
to confine them in small spaces on factory farms where they lead
incredibly impoverished lives, but to impose a serious penalty to
protect them from rare sexual relations with humans. And if
inducing male animals to orgasm to obtain sperm for breeding
purposes is regarded as perfectly all right, why are actual sexual
relations qualitatively much worse? 75 The overwhelming reason
why sex with animals is forbidden is that it is regarded as utterly
degrading for the human beings who choose to engage in it.
Two alternative constitutional arguments against restrictive
laws about sexual behavior are ones of substantive due process
(or constitutional privacy) and equal protection. The minimal
notion of substantive due process 76 is that a law must have a
"rational basis," but for most kinds of laws courts have stretched
to find rational grounds for their enactment. A heightened
review has been exercised for laws regulating sexual behavior
and abortion, but the main emphasis has been on the underlying
right that is curtailed, not on the basis for restriction. The
Establishment Clause argument concerns reasons for enactment
rather than the nature of the behavior that is restricted. 77 Were
74 I am here assuming that the argument that the majority should be protected against
behavior that affronts it is not an appropriate claim of justice in a liberal society.
75 Perhaps the comedy show Ali G is a poor authority, but in one episode Borat
explains that in Kazakstan his job was to bring animals to orgasm for breeding.
76 "Due process" is mainly a matter of fair procedure. How far the Due Process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be used to review the substantive bases
for legislation is controversial among scholars and justices.
77 One can imagine some sort of weighing process in which the quality of the actions
restricted would influence evaluation of the reasons for restriction.
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the due process argument similarly to focus mainly on the
reasons for enactment, it would differ from the Establishment
Clause argument in disqualifying certain grounds for enactment,
whether they were religious or not. For example, suppose it were
determined that a mere wish to prevent immoral behavior
(absent any plausible theory of harm to entities deserving
protections) was an invalid basis for legislation. If a court then
decided that a prohibition on bestiality was grounded on such a
wish, it would not matter whether the moral opinion was
religious or not.
This illustration shows why, for practical purposes, the due
process approach has advantages over the establishment
approach. Whatever may have been the origins of feelings about
human beings having sexual relations with other species, most
people now would react that they are seriously degrading without
reference to specific religious views. For many subjects, people
might be hard put to say how far their feelings of revulsion
depend on religious premises and how far they rest on
nonreligious intuitions or cultural sentiments. Yet the
Establishment Clause approach requires such distinctions. 78
The second alternative constitutional argument is cast in
terms of oppressed groups. The idea is that regulation violates
Equal Protection of the Law. Laws against interracial marriage
violate equal protection; laws against intragender marriage could
be similarly viewed, since homosexuals as a group have long
suffered discrimination by the majority. For this alternative
argument, one needs to find a group that has suffered historical
discrimination, something easier to do with abortion laws and
limits on the privileges of gay couples than with fornication and
bestiality. In any event, these last few paragraphs are a caution
that Establishment Clause challenges to laws in our last two
categories are only one kind of constitutional claim against their
validity, and perhaps far from the most promising.
Our two crucial inquiries for Establishment Clause analysis
are (1) whether laws that are directed against behavior just
because it is immoral promote or endorse religion and (2) what
the connection would need to be between religious premises and
78 The strength of that approach is that it fits comfortably with notions of improper
religious purposes. It is harder to say that the Due Process clauses do not allow
prohibitions that reflect the moral sentiments of society.
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a law's enactment to generate an invalid establishment of
religion. On the question of promotion or endorsement, we need
to assume that the reason legislators prohibit behavior is not
because it bears a close relation to what they consider to be
distinctive and desirable religious practices. Arnold Loewy has
hypothesized a law requiring attendance at Methodist church on
Sunday because it is immoral not to go to that church 79 and a law
forbidding all members of society from driving vehicles during
the Jewish Sabbath.80 The first of these is obviously
unconstitutional because it requires attendance at particular
worship services; the connection of the second law to Sabbath
observance is also probably strong enough to make it a promotion
of that religious practice.8 1 Laws against homosexual acts and
bestiality are not quite like this. The legislators regard the
behavior as wrongful whenever it is engaged in, and refraining
from the behavior does not, in itself, involve any strong
connection to anyone's religious practices. 8 2
The two contrasting positions about laws that forbid behavior
just because it is immoral, according to a religious view, are that
(1) to enforce the morality of a religion is to promote and endorse
that religion8 3 and (2) to enforce morality is different from
promoting religion, and it has always been assumed that
legislatures can enforce the dominant morality in society.8 4 I
think a more discriminating analysis is needed.8 5 Let us suppose
that the overwhelming basis for a restriction is a religious view
that behavior is wrong. So long as it is clear that all legislators
want to do is to stop the behavior, their aim is not to promote the
religious practices of a particular religion. Whether citizens will
take the law as expressing approval of a particular religion may
79 Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV.
159, 166 (2003).
80 Loewy, supra note 82, at 164.
81 Loewy thinks that the strongest permissible argument for the ordinance would be to
protect the safety of the larger than usual number of pedestrians.
82 Of course, one might view refraining from sinful acts as parts of religious practice.
83 Loewy, supra note 82, at 161, concludes that a law should be held to violate the
Establishment Clause if it "simply condemns the activity because it is immoral."
84 See Michael Perry, Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality Does
Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663 (2001); see also Scott L.
Idleman, Religious Premises, Legislative Judgments, and the Establishment Clause, 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2002). Professor Idleman provides an extensive review of
relevant cases and competing scholarly opinions.
85 See GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 87-95.
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depend on circumstances, particularly on whether the religious
perspective about morality that wins enforcement is sharply at
odds with the moral views of others. Whether such approval is
present or not, I believe that requiring people to comply with the
moral code of a religion, absent any belief about ordinary harm to
entities deserving protection, is a kind of imposition of that
religious view on others. Thus, as a matter of theoretical
principle, I think enactment of a religious morality could violate
the Establishment Clause, even if the religion, as a set of beliefs
and religious practices, is not promoted or endorsed in the more
straightforward sense.
This comparatively modest view of when enforcement of a
religiously based morality might be regarded as violating the
Establishment Clause does not take us very far in a practical
sense, because we have yet to examine possible differences
between our fourth and fifth categories and to consider the
appropriate role of courts reviewing legislation. Were a legislator
to consider bestiality to be a grave sin even though he does not
believe it typically causes any damage in this life to voluntary
human participants and causes only a very slight impairment of
the interests of the animals, his rationale for prohibiting it would
fall into our fifth category. A law adopted by all legislators for
just this reason would violate the Establishment Clause, and,
according to my earlier claim, a single legislator who voted for
just this reason would either himself violate the Establishment
Clause, or would violate the spirit of the Establishment Clause,
by engaging in a course of action that would, if replicated by his
fellows, violate the Establishment Clause.
But suppose our legislator, instead, reasons as follows. My
religion condemns sexual relations with animals. This is
substantial evidence that such relations probably do harm
human participants in this life, giving them a degraded sense of
themselves and impairing their possibilities of healthy sexual
relations with other people. (We can understand a similar
argument about why frequent sexual relations with prostitutes
have a detrimental effect on committed relationships.) As we
have seen in respect to harm to third persons (and a future
human sexual partner might be regarded as a relevant third
person here), such a factual conclusion might or might not be
grounded on the theological truth of the religion. Even if it is
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grounded on the truth of the religion, I have suggested that
people should be as free to rely on their religious convictions as
on nonreligious intuitions in respect to factual questions about
which natural science and social science provide no convincing
answers. If the evidence is scanty of what happens to otherwise
healthy individuals who happen to engage in sexual relations
with animals 86-we might imagine shepherds left alone with
flocks of sheep for many months-one would expect citizens and
legislators to rely on their own senses about likely consequences.
Many of them would not easily distinguish their religiously
informed sense from the intuitions they would have otherwise.
Once we acknowledge that religion may properly play a role in
influencing judgment about harms to voluntary actors, we can
see just how narrow is our last category-prohibition because an
act is morally wrong, but without a belief in ordinary harmful
consequences.
A further clarification narrows that category even further. We
have touched in other chapters on arguments that a liberal
society should not make judgments about the good life. These
arguments are closely similar to J. S. Mill's principle in On
Liberty that the government has no business constraining self-
regarding acts. That principle rules out paternalistic legislation
designed to protect actors against their own misguided choices.
Neither neutrality about the good life nor anti-paternalism has
ever been an accepted premise of actual liberal democracies or of
our constitutional law. Further, were either of these principles to
be adopted as part of our constitutional law, the logical vehicle
would be some form of substantive due process, not the
Establishment Clause. The reason is simple. Paternalism and
judgments about the good life can flow from nonreligious as well
as religious sources. Neither of these proposed restraints on
legislative action would be limited to religious visions about the
good life or the need to protect actors from themselves. If it
continues to be true that neither of these controversial principles
becomes part of our constitutional law, then the factual reasons
that our fourth category embraces would include factual claims
that relate to "the good life" and to the need for paternalism.
86 The evidence could not be drawn from a random selection of those who engage in
bestiality in a modern society, because, very likely, those who do so in a culture in which
it is so condemned may be psychologically unhealthy to begin with.
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People could rely on religious convictions that inform their
factual judgments about healthy forms of life and desirable
protections against bad choices.
The division between our last two categories has implications
for government officials. Suppose a legislator thinks that
bestiality is definitely a sin and probably has adverse
psychological consequences for human participants. In deciding
whether to vote for criminalization, the legislator should not
count his simple judgment about sin; rather, he should ask if the
likely adverse consequences are sufficient to justify making the
behavior a crime. It is possible that if he performs this exercise
conscientiously, he will see that the legitimate reasons for voting
to criminalize are weaker than he initially thought, that if he
discounts his "pure" judgment of sin, he does not believe the
probable consequences are damaging enough to warrant a
prohibition.
But what is a court to do? We can roughly sketch out three
possible standards for judicial application of the Establishment
Clause:8 7 (1) A law violates the Establishment Clause if religious
convictions were influential in its adoption. (2) A law violates the
Establishment Clause if "a substantial number of religious
skeptics" would not have supported it.88 (3) A law violates the
Establishment Clause if the ascertainable dominant reason for
its passage was a view that acts are immoral, based on a
religious point of view and detached from any perspective about
harm in this life that would be sufficient to justify a prohibition
or regulation. The third position is my own. Given all the other
ways religious judgments can figure in legislative choice, given
the mixture of religious and nonreligious reasons individuals
may have, given the mixture of reasons different legislators bring
to bear, and given the deference courts do and should show to
legislative decisions, this approach will rarely, if ever, lead a
court to invalidate a law.
The first approach is much too broad. Religious convictions
figure in many appropriate ways in the judgments of citizens and
legislators. For that reason and because of considerations of
87 I put aside here fact sensitive appraisals that a particular law strongly, if indirectly,
endorses some religion.
88 Loewy, supra note 82.
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deference, much too much legislation would be held invalid were
religious influence sufficient to render laws invalid.
The second approach may seem more promising. If a court
asks whether a substantial number of skeptics would support the
legislation, that seems reasonably deferential to the legislature.
The court is not applying a fine-toothed comb to the legislative
process or trying to pry apart mixed motives. If few skeptics
would support legislation, is not that a sure indication that
religious convictions underlie it? This approach, however,
founders on three objections. The first objection is that it will not
be easy to decide whether the number of skeptics would be
substantial, and how substantial is "substantial"? The second
objection involves the connection between religious grounds and
nonreligious ones. Suppose it were determined that the number
of skeptics who would restrict embryonic stem cell research is not
substantial. Suppose it were also determined that many serious
Roman Catholics believe with Professor Robert George that the
wrongness of stem cell research can be established on
nonreligious "scientific" or natural law grounds. A substantial
number of citizens do believe the wrongness of research need not
depend on religious convictions. Are we to label these citizens as
dishonest or deluded, to say that their self-consciously
nonreligious understanding does not count because they have a
religious understanding with the same import for legal
regulation and we know that the latter drives the former? That
is not an approach that is very respectful of fellow citizens and it
is not the kind of judgment a court should be essaying.
The third objection takes us back to the various ways religious
convictions can figure. Professor Loewy puts forward his test as
an application of a principle that the legislature cannot simply
condemn an activity because it is immoral. That sounds like our
fifth category. But it is possible that many people with religious
convictions will believe, not unreasonably, that an activity (such
as marriages of people of the same gender) will have harmful
enough consequences to justify a prohibition, although few
skeptics will agree. In their minds, these religious people would
not be forbidding the activity simply because it is immoral, they
think they would be protecting people from harm.
Having argued that many reliances on religious convictions are
appropriate, I do not accept a standard that would render laws
[Vol. 22:2
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invalid if few skeptics would support them. I have resisted the
idea that all legislation of religious morality is constitutional,
but, as far as courts are concerned, and apart from situations in
which a religion or a specific religious outlook is promoted or
endorsed, the limits on appropriate grounds for laws are too
narrow to have much practical significance.

